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Abstract—A novel proposal to design radiation-tolerant em-
bedded systems combining hardware and software mitigation
techniques is presented. Two suites of tools are developed to
automatically apply the techniques and to facilitate the trade-
offs analyses.
Index Terms—Fault tolerance, Radiation effects, Reliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
During last decades the progressive miniaturization of elec-
tronic components has led important advances in microproces-
sors, such as the dramatically increase of their performance.
However, while technology shrinks, voltage source level and
noise margins are also reduced, causing that electronic devices
have become less reliable and microprocessors more suscepti-
ble to transient faults induced by radiation. These intermittent
faults do not provoke a permanent damage, but may result in
an incorrect program execution by altering signal transfers or
stored values, the so called soft errors [1].
In order to face reliability problems, applying redundant
hardware has been the usual solution. From low level struc-
tures, using techniques like: Error-Correcting Code, parity
bits, Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR); up to more complex
components like functional units [2], co-processors [3]; or
by means of exploiting the multiplicity of hardware blocks
available on multi-threaded/multi-core architectures [4], [5].
Most hardware approaches provide a high accurate solution
for transient faults. However, these techniques are unfeasible
in many cases due to high costs involved.
Motivated by the need of low cost solutions, several pro-
posals based on redundant software have been developed
[6], [7], [8]. While software-based approaches are cheaper
than hardware-based ones, they cannot achieve the same
performance or reliability, since they must execute additional
instructions.
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In the case of embedded systems, there are large domains of
applications where factors like cost, power and performance
are as important as reliability. For this kind of applications,
optimal solutions can be found combining software and hard-
ware aspects of different techniques. Several of these hybrid
approaches has been proposed in recent years showing promis-
ing results [9], [10]. However, they are very specific and lack
of flexibility to get the best trade-offs between fault detection
capabilities and the usual embedded design constraints.
In this context, the first contribution of this work is the
use of the co-design methodology [11] in the development of
hybrid soft errors mitigation strategies. That is, the process
of exploring the space of hardware and software techniques
to achieve a customized fault tolerant version of the system
that best meet the requirements of the application. To aim this
goal, as the second contribution of this paper, two suites of
tools have been developed: a Software Hardening Environment
[12] aimed to implement, automatically apply and evaluate
software-only fault tolerant techniques; and a FPGA-based
fault emulation tool, called FTUnshades [13], that permits
to assess several reliability metrics of the overall embedded
system. As case study for validating our approach, we have
explored the hardening of an embedded application based on
the PicoBlaze soft-microprocessor [14]. Mitigation techniques
are applied to a high abstraction level so the final deployment
platform could be an ASIC or an anti-fuse FPGA. Different
trade-offs among code overhead, performance, fault coverage
and hardware costs have been studied.
II. HARDENING INFRASTRUCTURE
A. Software Hardening Environment
This environment lets the user to design and implement
software-only fault tolerance techniques, and also to automat-
ically apply them into programs. It is made up of a generic
Hardener, and a generic Instruction Set Simulator—ISS, jointly
with several compiler front-ends and back-ends to deal with
different microprocessor targets (Fig. 1).
A given compiler front-end takes the original source code
from a supported target, performs lexical, syntactical and se-
mantic analyses, and finally generates the Generic Instruction
Flow (GIF) as output. This flow represents an intermediate
high level abstraction of the program. Then the hardening tasks
are performed within the Generic Hardening Core (GH-Core).
Finally, it produces the Hardened-GIF (HGIF) which is then
re-targeted to a custom supported microprocessor. In this way,
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Fig. 1. Software Hardening Environment
it is also possible to generate protected code for a different
target than original.
Among various advantages of our proposal we highlight that
the GH-Core is based on a Microprocessor Generic Architec-
ture. It allows providing an uniform hardening environment
that permits to design and implement different techniques in a
platform independent way. The automatic generation of hard-
ened code is guided by instruction-level code transformation
rules (we obtain hardened assembler code).
The GH-Core has two main components: the Hardener and
the ISS. The Hardener comprises a sort of common procedures
that can be used to design new hardening software-based
techniques. On the other hand, the ISS assists the designer
in the implementation of them. It allows to perform different
analyses on the GIF and HGIF to check the correctness of the
hardening process, and also offers useful information in the
co-design process: time and space overheads, fault-coverage
estimations, etc. In order to evaluate the reliability provided
by the software techniques, the ISS is also able to simulate
Single Event Upset—SEU faults by means of a single bit-flip
into a bit. Therefore, the Hardener+ISS offer a rich set of co-
design parameters that can be used to perform an exhaustive
soft-wide design space exploration.
Considering hardening purposes, as it was suggested by
Reis et al. [8], the Hardener classifies in a special way those
instructions whose function imply to cross the borders of the
Sphere of Replication (SoR) [15]. The SoR is the logic domain
of redundant execution. Therefore, when an instruction causes
that some data enter inside the SoR (e.g. reading a port, loading
a value into a register or reading from memory), we will
classify it as inSoR; and consequently when an instruction
provokes data going out from the SoR (e.g. writing on a
port, storing into the memory), we will classify it as outSoR.
Note that the boundaries of the SoR, and consequently the
coverage of the protection, could change according to the
implemented technique. For instance, including/excluding the
memory subsystem inside the SoR jointly with the register
file, or even moving some selectively-chosen registers from
the register file inside/outside the SoR.
B. SEU-Emulation Tool: FTUnshades
The second main component of the hardening infrastructure
is FTUnshades [13]. It is a FPGA-based platform for the
study of digital circuit reliability against radiation-induced soft
errors. SEU affecting the circuit are emulated by inducing bit-
flips in the circuit under study, by means of dynamic partial
reconfiguration. The system is composed of a FPGA emulation
board and a suite of software tools for testing the emulated
design and analyzing test results. In this work, FTUnshades
is used to assess the reliability of the full HW/SW mitigation
strategy applied in the physical implementation of the system.
III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In order to validate our proposal, we have designed and
evaluated a number of radiation-tolerant versions of an em-
bedded system. The co-design space exploration is driven by
a well known application (mmult - matrix multiplication). The
hardware is composed of a technology-independent (i.e. valid
for ASIC or FPGA) version of PicoBlaze developed for this
work (RTL PicoBlaze). This micro is a 8-bit width softcore
widely used within FPGA-based applications. We have had
two sources of variation when tuning our system, the different
hardened versions of the software, and the selective hardening
of the RTL PicoBlaze. Both of them are controlled by a sort
of design parameters of interest (set of registers to harden by
software or hardware, fault tolerance technique, etc.).
A. Development of hybrid hardening strategies
In this case study, an adaptation of SWIFT-R [16] has been
implemented. This is a software-only recovery technique that
consists of triplication of data and instructions, jointly with
the insertion of verification points to check data consistency
(by means of majority voters).
The flexibility of our Software Hardening Environment
allows to apply automatically specific techniques in a selective
way. In this case study, SWIFT-R has been implemented to be
incrementally applied to several subsets of selected registers
from the microprocessor register file. This is possible by
moving the remaining registers outside of the SoR. In addition,
to help the designer prioritizing registers to protect, the GH-
Core gathers information about: the number of clock cycles
the microprocessor registers must keep a valid value (lifetime,
which has a high impact on reliability), and the code and
execution time overheads. Fig. 2 shows the overheads results
for several selectively hardened registers subsets (from sixteen
possible PicoBlaze registers, hexadecimal numbered). These
results are normalized with a baseline built with the non-
hardened version. The registers used in the mmult program
are: 0, A, D, E, and F. Those ones with the higher lifetime
are A and F (85.7% and 83.3% of the total clock cycles,
respectively), and consequently they are the firsts candidates
to be hardened.
On the hardware side, the fault tolerant co-design strat-
egy was complemented by incrementally hardening some
microprocessor resources. It was done by manually applying
TMR to different subsets of micro-architectural registers. The
following versions have been generated: non-hardened RTL
PicoBlaze (P0); microprocessor with hardware redundancy for
Program Counter – PC, Flags and Stack Pointer – SP (P1);
hardware redundancy for all registers in the pipeline (P2);
hardware redundancy for PC, Flags, SP, and Pipeline (P3); and
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Fig. 2. Normalized code and execution time overheads
a full protected version, i.e. microprocessor with redundancy
for Register file, PC, Flags, SP, and Pipeline (P4).
Using the information provided by the GH-Core and the
synthesis tools, the designer can select the bests candidates
for further analyses. However, for demonstration purposes, all
the systems, 16 software versions jointly with the 5 different
version of the microprocessor (in total 80 systems), have been
synthesized and implemented using the Xilinx ISE 10.1 suite
tool.
B. Reliability evaluation
To evaluate reliability, the well known SEU fault model is
used. That is, only one SEU is injected during each program
execution. The fault is injected by a bit-flip in a randomly se-
lected bit from the microprocessor during a program execution.
Faults were classified according to their effect on the expected
program behavior as in [16]. If a fault makes the program to
finish without producing the expected output, it is marked as
a Silent Data Corruption (SDC) fault. If the program finishes
producing the expected output, the fault is marked as an
unnecessary for Architecturally Correct Execution (unACE).
Finally, if a fault causes the abnormal program termination or
an infinite execution loop, fault is marked as a Hang.
For calibration purposes of FTUnshades tool, this is, calcu-
late the minimal number of SEUs needed for an accurate fault
emulation campaign, a previous experiment was carried out. In
this way, Fig. 3 presents the unACE faults percentage obtained
varying the number of injected SEUs to the register file of
the P0 micro running the non-hardened program, which is the
worst case scenario. The results show that the 95% confidence
interval is less than ±1.0% after 5200 injected SEUs.
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Fig. 3. Incremental injection fault campaign for calibration purposes
A second experiment using FTUnshades was performed
to evaluate the overall reliability of every one of the 80
configurations of the system. Every test campaign makes selec-
tive attacks on the microprocessor register subsets (including
register file, PC, flags, SP and pipeline). In each register
subset, 5200 SEUs (one per run) have been emulated in a
randomly selected clock cycle from all the workload duration,
for a total of 26000 SEUs. Fig 4 presents the fault classification
percentages obtained for each system. These results are the
weighted average of the results from the selective attacks to the
internal microprocessor register subsets, assuming the same
fault probability for all bits on target.
Note that the SWIFT-R technique offers a considerable
reliability increment, even in the non-hardened hardware (up
to 95.38% unACE faults in the full hardened program), which
is much higher than the reliability of every hardware-hardened
approach using the non-hardened program. Results for the
P4 micro approach are not showed in Fig. 4 because 100%
of the injected faults were classified as unACE, as expected.
Furthermore, notice that combining SWIFT-R with hardware
protection only to critical registers, such as PC, Flags, and SP
(P1 approach), gives a remarkable reliability increase (up to
98.32% unACE faults).
C. Discussion
Taking into account the requirements of the application
under design, the analysis of overheads jointly with reliability
results is a very important key during the co-design process.
These results facilitate to find the solutions having the best ro-
bustness/overhead compromise. For instance, SWIFT-R applied
only for the register subset {A, D, E, F} running in the P3
microprocessor is an interesting choice, because it offers both,
high reliability (98.68% of unACE faults), and acceptable code
and execution time overheads (×1.80 and ×1.56 respectively).
Although reliability is higher when combining software-
hardened programs with hardware-redundant approaches (for
instance, up to 99.10% unACE faults for the P3 micro),
hardware costs are also higher, which is an important fact
that must be considered. Fig 5, on the one hand, shows the
hardware costs of each approach normalized with a baseline
built with the non-hardened RTL PicoBlaze (P0); on the other
hand, it also depicts, in a secondary axis, the percentage
of unACE faults obtained for the SWIFT-R program (all
registers hardened). This figure permits to see at a glance, how
reliability and costs are affected by every studied hardware
approach. The hardware costs were provided by the Xilinx XST
10.1 synthesis tool. They are expressed in terms of: Flip/Flops
and Latches, primitives (mux, luts, etc.), and RAM (distributed
and block ram).
It is worth noting that hardware cost increases considerably
when the registers in the pipeline are hardened (P2 and
P3), whereas the reliability only improves slightly in these
cases, or even decreases if compared with cheaper approaches
(P2+SWIFT-R). In case of P4, high hardware costs may result
unsuitable for many designs, although its reliability is 100%.
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Fig. 4. Fault classification percentages for every selectively-hardened software version and selectively-hardened hardware approach
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Finally, obtained results allows the designer to decide which
HW/SW configuration best meet the requirements of each
specific application. For instance, in this case study might
result as a suitable configuration the prototype with the P1
hardware and SWIFT-R applied to the register set {A-D-
E-F} on the software side, because it offers high level of
reliability (97.43% of unACE faults) with acceptable costs
and overheads. In some other applications, for example, if
the performance degradation exceeds required, it might be
preferable applying another more lightweight technique for
the software, and incrementing protection and cost on the
hardware side.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents a novel approach to design fault tolerant
embedded systems. The co-design methodology jointly with
the developed tool suites allow an easy exploration of the
design space between hardware-only and software-only miti-
gation techniques. The resulting hybrid strategies are tuned to
best fit the reliability requirements and the design constraints
at the same time. The advantages of our proposal have been
illustrated by means of a case study. As future work, the in-
frastructure can be extended to support 32-bit microprocessors,
given the fact that it is based on a Microprocessor Generic
Architecture.
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